Who has the Last Laugh - A Look at Defamation in Humor by Glasberg, Cary Dee
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review Law Reviews
3-1-1989
Who has the Last Laugh - A Look at Defamation in
Humor
Cary Dee Glasberg
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cary Dee Glasberg, Who has the Last Laugh - A Look at Defamation in Humor, 9 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 381 (1989).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/elr/vol9/iss2/9
WHO HAS THE LAST LAUGH? A LOOK AT
DEFAMATION IN HUMOR
Sticks and stones may break our bones, but names can never hurt us.
Or can they? This casenote discusses the difficulties courts have in deter-
mining when jokes are not funny and when names may break bones. It
further discusses why juries rather than judges should determine when
funny is funny and when it is not. We all have a funny-bone but there is
always some point at which the tickle becomes a scratch.
Section 559 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that "a
communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of
another as to lower him in the esteem of the community or to deter third
persons from association in dealing with him."' Actions in which private
figure plaintiffs allege defamation within a humorous context present
unique problems which require special consideration. One such case is
Mendelson v. Carson.2 In Carson, Michael Mendelson, a dentist, brought
suit against Carson alleging libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress. Mendelson based his claims on a comedy
skit performed by Johnny Carson on the Tonight Show.3 The court held
that Carson's statements were not defamatory as a matter of law,4 and
that Mendelson's claims for emotional distress5 and invasion of privacy6
were factually unsupported. Accordingly, the court granted Carson's
motion to dismiss.7
I. MENDELSON V CARSON
In a Tonight Show monologue, aired April 18, 1986, Johnny Carson
commented on a report that dentists in the United States were going out
of business due to improved dental techniques. Carson stated: "I
haven't been so happy about a group disbanding since the Gestapo."8 In
response, Mendelson wrote a letter to Carson expressing displeasure with
the comparison drawn between dentists and the Gestapo. Mendelson
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
2. N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 1988, at 13, col. 1.
3. Id
4. Id. at 13, col. 3.
5. Id.
6. N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 1988, at 13, col. 3.
7. Id at 13, col. 3. This Note addresses only the issues involved in the defamation cause
of action.
8. Id at 13, col. 1.
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wrote that Carson's joke "resorted to the anachronistic and damaging
myth of a dental appointment as a sadomasochistic vaudeville act as an
easy way to amuse your audience."9 Mendelson demanded a "smirk-free
public apology."'
Several weeks later, Carson responded to Mendelson's letter on the
Tonight Show.1 The following, a portion of Carson's actual response, is
the basis upon which Mendelson brought suit.
JOHNNY CARSON: Well all right, Dr. Mendelson. I
didn't mean to compare dentists as individuals to the Gestapo.
I was saying we're a little apprehensive about going to the den-
tist.., you have to have a little sense of humor. So, I'm glad
you sent me this letter, Mr. Mendelson, because it's a chance to
do the second segment of this.
I think the Governor of Nevada was the first recipient of
this award-Governor Bryant of Nevada-and Mr. Mendel-
son the second. So we say: Lighten Up Michael Mendelson,
D.D.S. [Carson goes to podium in front of a marquis bearing
the name: Michael Mendelson, D.D.S.]
JOHNNY CARSON: Dr. Mendelson, may I call you
Michael? Far be it from me to criticize the noble profession of
dentistry which has a long and honorable tradition dating back
to the Spanish Inquisition. Michael, there is only one phrase
Americans fear more than nuclear war and that phrase is:
"root canal." What better way to spend an afternoon than re-
clining in a dentist's chair listening to a 6,000 r.p.m. high speed
drill, smelling your tooth enamel burn as clouds of smoke bil-
low out of your mouth....
In closing, dentists are dedicated, highly trained, hard
working professionals and a dentist takes off only three days a
year. Christmas, Thanksgiving and the Marquis de Sade's
birthday. So, lighten up Michael Mendelson, D.D.S.
Thank you. 2
Mendelson alleged that the lighted marquis which displayed his
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 1988, at 13, col. 1.
12. Id. at 13, col. 1-2. The following is the entire transcript:
JOHNNY CARSON: Now a few weeks ago-we've done this once before, this
segment- I told a joke in a monologue, and I'm going to tell you the joke. First of
all, humor is relative, you know, depending on how you receive something-it's
funny to you or not. The joke was like this: I said, "According to a recent business
report, dentists in the United States are going out of business due to improvements in
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name and professional designation throughout the entire skit, together
with Carson's remarks, were defamatory personal attacks that subjected
dental techniques and in the use of fluoride." I said, "Imagine dentists going out of
business. I haven't been so happy about a group disbanding since the Gestapo."
JOHNNY CARSON: Well obviously I think anybody who has a sense of hu-
mor or is reasonable didn't think that I was equating dentists as human beings as
members of a racist band. What I was trying to say, and maybe didn't do it too well,
was that people are apprehensive about going to the dentist. They wouldn't want to
face the Gestapo. I could have probably said "Attilla the Hun and his group" broke
up too, right.
JOHNNY CARSON: How many of you enjoy, for example, going to the den-
tist [light applause] No, I'm serious, now. How many of you had a dental appoint-
ment tomorrow and it cleared up tonight, wouldn't go in tomorrow? [loud applause]
Anyway, I received a letter after that joke from a Dr. Michael Mendelson, who hap-
pens to be a dentist.
ED McMAHON: He was not happy.
JOHNNY CARSON: Not happy.
"Dear Mr. Carson: I was shocked and angered this evening to hear your dis-
gusting comparison to the declining economic well-being of America's dentists to the
Gestapo being disbanded."
JOHNNY CARSON: I didn't mean that you know.
"To compare this same group of doctors to a gang of sadistic and bigoted thugs
is ludicrous."
JOHNNY CARSON: Of course it is. I had to go to my dentist the next day,
Ray Jacobson, and he came in with one of those little picks and said: "Pretty funny
last night." But he understood that we meant it in good humor. Dr. Mendelson goes
on:
"Perhaps you feel that dentists as a group are too serious, that they have no
sense of humor. The general public shows a lack of understanding that dentistry is a
sophisticated and demanding health care field. It is sad that you've resorted to the
anachronistic and damaging myth of a dental appointment as a sadomasochistic
vaudeville act as a easy way to amuse your audience. I assume a smirk-free public
apology is forthcoming."
JOHNNY CARSON: Well all right, Dr. Mendelson. I didn't mean to compare
dentists as individuals to the Gestapo. I was saying we're a little apprehensive about
going to the dentist. You have to have a little sense of humor. So, I'm glad you sent
me this letter, Mr. Mendelson, because it's a chance to do the second segment of this.
I think the Governor of Nevada was the first recipient of this award-Governor
Bryant of Nevada-and Mr. Mendelson the second. So we say: Lighten Up Michael
Mendelson, D.D.S. [Carson goes to podium in front of marquis bearing the name:
Michael Mendelson, D.D.S.]
JOHNNY CARSON: Dr. Mendelson, may I call you Michael? Far be it from
me to criticize the noble profession of dentistry which has a long and honorable
tradition dating back to the Spanish Inquisition. Michael, there is only one phrase
Americans fear more than nuclear war and that phrase is: "root canal." What better
way to spend an afternoon than reclining in a dentist's chair listening to a 6,000
r.p.m. high speed drill, smelling your tooth enamel burn as clouds of smoke billow
out of your mouth.
JOHNNY CARSON: Yes, Mike, dentists say that x-rays are safe, that you get
more radiation from the sun. Oh really? How many people do you see lying on the
beach of Santa Monica with lead aprons on their laps? Dentists serve a vital purpose
in our society. Were it not for dentists, we would never have the opportunity to look
up a grown man's nose.
Michael, I won't say that dentists are kinky, but how many other people do you
know who get their jollies sticking a tiny mirror in a truck driver's mouth to look at a
piece of pork sausage caught on his molar?
Mike, you're a member of a priviliged profession. There are only two groups of
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9
him to ridicule from the community. 13
Carson moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. 14 He
asserted that his statements were neutral, an expression of his opinion,
and generalized, rather than statements "of and concerning" Mendel-
son.15 Carson further stated that even if his remarks were directed at
Mendelson, they were merely satirical, comedic exaggerations and hyper-
bole which could not be taken literally or reasonably be considered state-
ments of fact. 
16
The New York Supreme Court began its inquiry by assuming that
Carson's statements were directed at Mendelson. After viewing a video-
tape of the monologue in question, the court concluded that the dentistry
sequence may have been "of and concerning" Mendelson. 17 The court
based this determination on the prominently displayed marquis and Car-
son's references to Mendelson. However, the court noted that this alone
would not support a defamation claim.' 8 The court explained that if the
dentistry sequence was reasonably susceptible of a defamatory connota-
tion, the case would be sent to a jury to determine whether Mendelson
was defamed. Otherwise, the court would dismiss the case. 9 The court
explained that for statements to be defamatory, they must be examined in
the context of the entire show. Further, the court must test statements
against the understanding of the average listener without applying any
strained or artificial construction2° and must bear in mind the temper of
professionals that spend their working days watching water go round and round in a
little bowl. Dentists and men's rooms attendants.
Yes, Doctor, in recent years there have been advancements in dentistry-stereo
headphones for patients to wear, quieter drills but there's one new advance that den-
tists should try for themselves: breath mints. That's right. The only thing that
smells worse than a dentist's breath is riding in a car pool with six wet grizzly bears.
As you know Mickey, women think dentists are romantic. What lady wouldn't
want to be embraced by a man whose shirt sleeves are soggy with a stranger's saliva?
In closing, dentists are dedicated, highly trained, hard working professionals
and a dentist takes off only three days a year. Christmas, Thanksgiving and the
Marquis de Sade's birthday. So, lighten up Michael Mendelson, D.D.S.
Thank you. [Carson seats himself again at his desk]
JOHNNY CARSON: Now there was no smirking there.
ED McMAHON: No smirking.
JOHNNY CARSON: You know, I have to go to the dentist next week. Oh
Boy.
13. Id at 13, col. 2.
14. Id.
15. Id.






the times.2" At this point, however, the court did not decide whether
these statements were capable of a defamatory meaning.
The court next discussed the first amendment protection of opinion,
noting that "there is no such thing as a false idea."22 Thus, since defama-
tion has an element of falsity to it, an opinion cannot be defamatory.23
The court reasoned that the skit was not actionable to the extent that it
reflected Carson's view that Mendelson took his profession too seriously
and should "lighten up," since it represented an opinion.24 However, the
court noted that "humor and comedy are not synonymous with opinion,
and as such, they are not subject to the blanket first amendment protec-
tions granted opinions. '' 25 The court stated: "mere jest will not justify an
assault on the reputation and business of another unless it is clear that it
in no way could be viewed as an attack on the person to whom it re-
lated."' 26 The court recognized that rhetorical hyperbole and statements
that are "patently humorous, devoid of serious meaning or intent, and
impossible of being reasonably understood otherwise ' 27 would not sus-
tain a defamation action. Further, the court specified that the key deter-
mination was whether the remarks gave the impression that they were
true.28
Applying these principles to Carson, the court noted that the routine
was part of a larger comedic performance that has existed nightly for
twenty-five years and is known to consist of "commentary containing
irony, satire, exaggeration and rhetorical hyperbole on contemporary
events and day-to-day concerns., 29 The court also noted that at the be-
ginning of the sequence, Carson directed Mendelson and the audience
not to take the remarks seriously and indicated that levity was the intent
of the skit.3 0 The court concluded that the skit contained gross exaggera-
tions and nonsensical statements that were comedic, not malicious, and
that persons hearing the routine could not possibly take it seriously.3'
21. N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 1988, at 13, col. 2.
22. Id.
23. Id. (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974)).
24. Id. at 13, col. 2.
25. Id. (quoting Frank v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 119 A.D.2d 252, 257, 506
N.Y.S.2d 869, 872 (1986)).
26. Id. (quoting Triggs v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 179 N.Y. 144, 155, 71 N.E.
739, 743 (1904)).
27. N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 1988, at 13, col. 2.
28. Id. at 13, col. 2-3.
29. Id at 13, col. 3.
30. Id It is apparent from the transcript of the Carson skit, that Carson did not direct
Mendelson or the audience to not take the remarks seriously nor did he state that levity was
the intent of the skit. Id. at 13, col. 1-2.
31. N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 1988, at 13, col. 2.
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Accordingly, the court decided the statements were not defamatory as a
matter of law and dismissed the libel action. a2
II. BALANCING THE COMPETING INTERESTS
A. Recognition Of The Value Of Humor And Its Limits
Although courts have recognized the value of humor in society,
33
they have been careful to emphasize that humor must have limits. In the
well recognized 1831 decision of Donoghue v. Hayes, the court stated that
the "principle is clear-a person shall not be allowed to murder an-
other's reputation in jest. If a man in jest conveys a serious imputation,
he jests at his peril."34
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals followed this principle in Bur-
ton v. Crowell Publishing Co.35 In that case, an advertisement for
"Camel" cigarettes showed a photo of the plaintiff, a well-known steeple-
chaser, posing for a weigh-in after a race. His saddle was situated in a
way suggesting an obscene and grotesque representation.36 The court
found that although the photo was an optical illusion that carried its
correction on its face, it portrayed the plaintiff as a "preposterously ridic-
ulous spectacle." The court determined that the photo may have affected
the plaintiff's reputation and exposed him to "more than trivial" ridi-
cule.37 The court stated that "not all ridicule or all disagreeable com-
ment is actionable; a man must not be too thin-skinned or a self-
important prig.",38 However, the court in holding that the picture was
prima facie actionable,39 acknowledged the appropriateness of limits on
humor. The court reasoned that the advertisement was "more than what
only a morbid person would not laugh off."'
B. Private Figures' Rights To Not Be Defamed
In conjunction with the Supreme Court's recognition of the value of
humor with limits, it has recognized that there is a legitimate state inter-
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Burton v. Crowell Publishing Co., 82 F.2d 154, 155 (2d Cir. 1936); Polygram
Records, Inc. v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 543, 553, 216 Cal. Rptr. 252, 258 (1985);
Frank v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 119 A.D.2d 252, 257, 506 N.Y.S.2d 869, 872 (1986).
34. Triggs, 179 N.Y. 144, 155, 71 N.E. at 743 (quoting Donoghue v. Hayes [1831], Hayes,
Irish Exchequer, 265, 266).
35. 82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936).
36. Id. at 154.
37. Id. at 155.
38. Id.
39. Burton, 82 F.2d at 156.
40. Id. at 155.
[Vol. 9
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est in compensating individuals for the harm inflicted by defamatory
falsehoods.4' The Court, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ,42 stated that an
individual's right to protect his own good name "reflects no more than
our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human be-
ing-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty."4
Further, the Court emphasized that private figure plaintiffs are more
vulnerable to injury and require greater protection from defamation than
public figure plaintiffs."4 The Court reasoned that public figures have
greater access to the press and other media, providing them with ample
and effective means to refute negative or erroneous statements. 45 By con-
trast, private individuals have relatively few, if any, opportunities to ob-
tain retractions or corrections.
Moreover, the Supreme Court suggested that those who seek promi-
nence in the public arena must pay the price for their recognition by
tolerating a certain amount of good and bad public commentary.4 6 Eas-
ily distinguishable is the private figure who has neither sought, nor bar-
gained for, a place amidst public debate, controversy, or scrutiny.
Accordingly, the Court concluded "that the States should retain substan-
tial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory false-
hood injurious to the reputation of a private individual."
47
C. Consideration Of Constitutional Rights
Although courts have emphasized the value of humor in society and
an individual's right not to be defamed, there is an important counter-
vailing factor that demands consideration- the first amendment rights of
freedom of speech and of the press. The Supreme Court, in Gertz, stated
that it was "especially anxious to assure to the freedoms of speech and
press that breathing space essential to their fruitful exercise."48 The re-
sult is a tension between the right of uninhibited speech and press, and
the right of individuals to be free from defamation. Numerous courts
have attempted to juggle these competing values; yet, courts appear to be
no closer to easing the tension.
In defamation cases, where the added element of humor is intro-
duced, this tension is accentuated. A possible explanation is that
41. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
42. Id
43. Id (citing Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966)(concurring opinion)).
44. Gertz; 418 U.S. at 344.
45. Id.
46. Id at 345.
47. Id at 345-46 (emphasis added).
48. Id at 342 (citation omitted).
1989)
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although courts are extolling the value and necessity of humor in society,
they remain reluctant to define humor or even demarcate a line between
what is humorous and what is defamatory.
In Polygram Records, Inc. v. Superior Court,49 David Rege, a wine
producer and distributor, brought suit against comedian Robin Williams
for a joke Williams told during his nightclub comedy performance.50
The California Court of Appeal held that the joke could not be taken
seriously by any sensible person and thus, was not defamatory as a mat-
ter of law.5" The court noted that "to hold otherwise would run afoul of
the First Amendment and chill the free speech rights of all comedy per-
formers and humorists, to the genuine detriment of our society.
' 52
Although the Polygram court recognized "that humor is an impor-
tant form of social commentary,"53 it rejected Williams' contention that
comedy, by definition, could not be taken seriously or literally, and thus,
could never be actionable for defamation.54 The court emphasized that
comedy is as resistant to interpretation as the term "obscenity. 5 5 The
court further stated that judicial reluctance to define humor should not
distress advocates of the constitutional rights of comedians "for if judges
assumed the responsibility to decide what is amusing and made the pro-
tections of the first amendment turn on their views, perhaps less putative
humor would be safeguarded than our restrained approach permits."'56
III. THE STANDARDS ARE NOT STANDARD
Courts have placed different weight on the competing interests in
defamation in humor cases. While this would not be unusual between
different jurisdictions, courts within the same jurisdiction have not been
any more consistent. This has resulted in the application of different
standards, as well as the inconsistent application of similar standards.
49. 170 Cal. App. 3d 543, 216 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1985).
50. Id at 546-47, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
Whoa-White Wine. This is a little wine here. If it's not wine, it's been through
somebody already. Oh.-There are White wines, there are Red wines, but why are
there no Black wines like: Rege, a Motherfucker. It goes with fish, meat, any damn
thing it wants to. I like my wine like I like my women, ready to pass out. Isn't it
nice though, having someone like Mean Joe Green advertising it-You better buy
this or I'll nail your ass to a tree.
Id
51. Id at 556-57, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 261. It is interesting to note that the court did not
advance a definition for the term "sensible person."
52. Id. at 557, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
53. Id. at 553, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
54. Id. at 552-53, Cal. Rptr. at 257-58.




A. Different Standards Used In New York
The courts in New York have applied very different standards to not
so different cases, and have reached inconsistent results. In Matherson v.
Marchello," a husband and wife brought suit against a group of musi-
cians, "The Good Rats," 8 alleging that the defendants made libelous
statements during a radio interview. 9 The radio station aired a commer-
cial advertising a party at OBI South, an establishment owned by the
plaintiffs. Subsequently, The Good Rats engaged in an on-the-air discus-
sion of why they were no longer allowed to play at the club. In doing so,
they mentioned the Mathersons by name.' The Mathersons objected to
The Good Rats' statement: "[W]e used to fool around with his wife... I
don't think it was his wife that he got upset about, I think it was when
somebody started messing around with his boyfriend that he really
freaked out."61
The New York Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order
granting the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action.62 The court stated that if the contested state-
ments were reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning, it would
then be appropriate for a jury to decide whether defamation had oc-
curred.6 3 The court emphasized that the words must be given their natu-
ral meaning without straining "to interpret them in their mildest and
most inoffensive sense in order to render them nondefamatory. ' 6 Thus,
looking at the context in which the statements were made and the com-
mon usage of the words, the court could not find as a matter of law that
the statements were nondefamatory. Accordingly, the court held that it
was a matter for a jury.65
The same court applied a different standard and reached a different
result in Frank v. National Broadcasting Co. 66 In that case, Maurice
Frank, an accountant, brought suit over a comedy segment aired on the
late night television comedy program Saturday Night Live.67 One day
57. 100 A.D.2d 233, 473 N.Y.S.2d 998 (A.D.2d 1984).
58. Id. at 234, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 1000. The suit was brought against The Good Rats as
individuals and against their record company.
59. Id. at 234, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 1000.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Matherson, 100 A.D.2d at 234, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 1000.
63. Id. at 240, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 1004.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 242, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 1005.
66. 119 A.D.2d 252, 506 N.Y.S.2d 869 (1986).
67. Id. at 253, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 870.
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prior to the deadline for filing income tax returns, Saturday Night Live
broadcasted a comedy skit called "Fast Frank Feature."68 A performer
bearing a noticeable physical resemblance to the plaintiff was introduced
as a tax consultant by the name of Maurice Frank.69 The character gave
absurd tax advice, such as suggesting that a houseplant be claimed as a
dependent, advising that a rotten tomato in the refrigerator could be
claimed as a "farm loss" for a frost ruined crop, and that acne medicine
could be deducted as an "oil depletion allowance."7
The New York Supreme Court Appellate Division determined that
the purported tax advice was so nonsensical and silly that no sensible
person could take the statements seriously.7 1 The court further con-
cluded that the statements were neither "so malicious or vituperative
that they would cause a person hearing them to hold the plaintiff in pub-
lic contempt or disgrace."72 After viewing the alleged defamatory state-
ments in context, the court held that as a matter of law the statements
were not defamatory, and granted the defendant's motion to dismiss.73
B. Identical Standards in New York with Inconsistent Results
Although some New York courts have applied the same standard
under similar fact patterns, they have not yielded consistent decisions. In
Triggs v. Sun Printing & Publishing Association,7 4 the plaintiff, a univer-
sity professor, complained of three libelous articles the defendant pub-
lished which satirically portrayed the professor as a pompous and
presumptuous literary freak.75 The New York Court of Appeals76 held
that any fair-minded person reading the articles would conclude that
they were harmful to the professor's reputation and tended to expose him
to public shame and ridicule.77 The court further stated that however
desirable jest may be, amusement should not be provided at the expense
of an individual's reputation or business.78 It characterized the articles
as scathing denunciations which transcended the limits of fair and honest
68. Id. at 254, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 870.
69. Id.
70. Id., 506 N.Y.S.2d at 870-71.
71. Frank, 119 A.D.2d at 261, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 179 N.Y. 144, 71 N.E. 739 (1904).
75. Id. at 155, 71 N.E. at 742.
76. The New York Special Terms overruled a demurrer to the complaint and on appeal
the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division reversed. Id. at 156, 71 N.E. at 742.
77. Id. at 153-54, 71 N.E. at 742.
78. Id. at 155, 71 N.E. at 742-43.
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criticism. As such, they were clearly actionable.79
By contrast, the court in Lamberti v. Sun Printing & Publishing As-
sociation,"o applied the same standard as that applied in Triggs, yet,
reached an opposite result."' In Lamberti, the action for libel was in
response to an article published in the defendant's newspaper describing
a joke played on Lamberti, the plaintiff. A group of Lamberti's friends
convinced him that he had an imprint of a black hand on his back, signi-
fying his membership in the "Black Hand Kidnappers." 2 Though the
article revealed that the incident was merely a prank, the plaintiff alleged
that the story implied he was a member of a secret society composed of
assassins, murderers, blackmailers, thieves and kidnappers.8 3 At the
time of publication, the press, particularly in New York, were reporting
numerous crimes allegedly committed by the same secret society. There-
fore, the court found the Black Hand Kidnappers had an exceptionally
high public profile.8 4 The court stated that any fair-minded person
would not regard the article as an attack on the plaintiff, but rather as a
practical joke which impaired neither the plaintiff's reputation nor his
affairs.8 5 Accordingly, the New York Supreme Court held that the lower
court appropriately granted the defendant's demurrer.86
C. Inconsistent Application of Standards in Federal Courts
While some state courts have relied on federal court standards, the
federal courts as well have not been able to come up with a uniform
standard. In Martin v. Municipal Publications ,87 the defendant's Phila-
delphia Magazine published a photograph of the plaintiff wearing his
"Mummer's" costume.8 8 The caption appearing below the picture stated
"A New Year's tribute here to all the ostriches who gave their tails to
make the world free for closet transvestites from South Philly to get
themselves stinking drunk."8 9 Although the photograph and caption ap-
79. Triggs, 179 N.Y. at 156, N.E. at 742-43.
80. 111 A.D. 437, 97 N.Y.S. 694 (1906).
81. The standard in both Triggs and Lamberti was, in essence, whether a fair-minded per-
son would regard the communication as harmful to the plaintiff's reputation. See Triggs, 179
N.Y. at 153-54, 71 N.E. at 742; Lamberti, 111 A.D. at 441, 97 N.Y.S. at 695.
82. 111 A.D. at 438-39, 97 N.Y.S. at 695.
83. Id. at 439, 97 N.Y.S. at 694.
84. Id., 97 N.Y.S. at 695.
85. Id. at 442, 97 N.Y.S. at 696.
86. Id., 97 N.Y.S. at 695.
87. 510 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
88. Id. at 257 n.1. Plaintiff marched in the 1978 New Year's Day Philadephia Mummers
Parade as a member of the Hegeman String Band.
89. Id. at 257.
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peared in a section of the magazine known for parody, satire and light
humor,90 the plaintiff brought a libel action.
In determining whether the challenged communication was capable
of a defamatory meaning, the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania considered whether it potentially harmed
the plaintiff's reputation in the community or deterred others from asso-
ciating with him.91 The court was not persuaded by the defendant's ar-
gument that reasonable people would not take the picture and caption
seriously. The court reasoned that although the picture and caption ap-
peared in the humor section of the magazine, readers may have seen the
photo but were unfamiliar with the magazine or its humor section.92
Consequently, the court held that the photograph and caption could not
be deemed incapable of a defamatory meaning as a matter of law. 93 Ac-
cordingly, the court denied the defendant's motion for summary
judgment.
94
In Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd. ,9" the controversy centered
on a Penthouse magazine spoof of the Miss Wyoming contestant at the
Miss America contest.96 The article described Miss Wyoming perform-
ing physically impossible sexual acts and fantasizing about bizarre sexual
incidents while competing in the pageant. 97 The plaintiff, who was Miss
Wyoming, charged Penthouse with defamation.9 In reversing the jury's
decision, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held as a matter of law that
the descriptions in the article were merely rhetorical hyperbole and pure
fantasy, both of which are protected by the first amendment. 99 Judge
Breitenstein, in dissent, stated that although the article was characterized
as humor in the table of contents, °0 readers could find that it exhibited
sexual deviation, perversion, and defamed the plaintiff by placing her in a
false light. 101 Judge Breitenstein also stated that the case should not have
been decided as a matter of law.'0 2 Further, he stated that the article
contained both fact and fiction, that Penthouse did not present the article
90. Id. at 258.
91. Id
92. Martin, 510 F. Supp. at 258.
93. Id.
94. Id at 259.
95. 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983).
96. Id. at 439.
97. Id. at 440-41.
98. Id. at 439.
99. Id. at 443.
100. Pring, 695 F.2d at 444 (Breitenstein, dissenting).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 445.
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as fiction, characterizing it instead as humor, and that there was not a
disclaimer of reference to any living or dead person. 03 Accordingly, he
agreed with the jury's conclusion that a reasonable person would under-
stand that the article referred to the plaintiff, was false and defamatory,
and that it would damage the plaintiff's reputation."°4
D. Reliance On Standards From Outside Jurisdictions
A number of courts, in both federal and state cases, have engaged in
a type of "jurisdiction-hopping": citing standards from cases in other
jurisdictions as support for their decisions. In Frank, a New York deci-
sion, the court referred to standards from federal cases from New York
and Wyoming, and a California case. 105
In Burton, a federal case from New York, the court stated a stan-
dard and then qualified it by citing a New York case. 106 Additionally, in
the California case Polygram, the court relied on a federal case from Wy-
oming as support for its standard.10 7 Following suit, the Carson court
relied on standards from a California decision and from a federal case
from Wyoming.
0 8
The practice of relying on nonbinding authority implies a lack of
adequate standards, and the discomfort judges have with the current
standards. Consequently, courts are applying different standards in an
inconsistent manner.
E. Current Status Of Defamation Standards
In addition to applying inconsistent standards, the courts have re-
lied on an array of nonuniform, unclearly defined, and ambiguous stan-
dards. This has resulted in considerably subjective and inconsistent
applications to determine when humor is, or can be, defamatory.
The cases examined illustrate that courts have looked to a multitude
of standards such as: 1) whether "fair-minded" (an undefined term) peo-
103. Id. at 444.
104. Id.
105. Frank v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc. 119 A.D.2d 252, 257, 506 N.Y.S.2d 869, 875
(1986). The three cases the court relied on were Burton v. Crowell Publishing Co., 82 F.2d
154 (2d Cir. 1936); Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982);
Polygram Records, Inc. v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 543, 216 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1985).
106. Burton v. Crowell Publishing Co., 82 F.2d 154, 155 (2d Cir. 1936). The case the court
relied upon was Lamberti v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 111 A.D. 437, 97 N.Y.S. 694
(1906).
107. Polygram Records, Inc. v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App. 3d 543, 557, 216 Cal. Rptr.
252, 261 (1985). The court relied on Pring 695 F.2d 438.
108. N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 1988, at 13, col. 2-3. The court cited Polygram, 170 Cal. App. 3d
543, 216 Cal. Rptr. 252 and Pring, 695 F.2d 438, cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983).
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ple would conclude that the statements were injurious to the plaintiff's
reputation and exposed him to public shame and ridicule;"° 2) whether
the statements could be regarded as an attack;"' 3) whether "sensible"
people would take the statements seriously;"' 4) whether the statements
were so nonsensical and silly that no person would believe them;" 2 5) if
the statements were malicious or vituperative and if so, whether listeners
would hold the plaintiff in public contempt or disgrace;" 13 and the catch-
all 6) whether the statements could be reasonably susceptible to a defam-
atory meaning. "1
4
IV. THE PROBLEMS IN DEFAMATION IN HUMOR ACTIONS
As a result of the courts' inability to deal with defamation in humor,
several problems have arisen. Initially, the courts have reached different
and inconsistent standards in according different weights to the compet-
ing interests of an individual's right not to be defamed, the societal value
of humor, and constitutional guarantees of free speech and press. In
turn, this has resulted in inconsistent results in factually similar cases.
The inherently subjective nature of humor combined with the sub-
jective method courts use to formulate their standards further com-
pounds the problem. While courts may agree that humor is subjective
and cannot or should not be judicially defined," 5 judges still must ini-
tially determine whether a humorous communication is reasonably sus-
ceptible to a defamatory meaning, and therefore, actionable.
There are no set standards with which to guide judges in making
these determinations. Judges' personal sentiments regarding humor will
determine which plaintiffs were potentially defamed and which plaintiffs
were not defamed. Consequently, a plaintiff's opportunity to have a jury
hear his or her case will subjectively rest solely on the judge's
predisposition.
The reasons for this are largely a result of the highly subjective ele-
109. Triggs v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 179 N.Y. 144, 153-54, 71 N.E. 739, 742
(1904).
110. Lamberti v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 111 A.D. 437, 441, 97 N.Y.S. 694, 696
(1906).
111. Polygram, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 557, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
112. Frank 100 A.D.2d at 261, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
113. Id.
114. Matherson v. Marchello, 100 A.D.2d 233, 240, 473 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1004 (1984) (quot-
ing James v. Gannett Co., 386 N.Y.S.2d 871, 353 N.E.2d 834 (1976)).
115. The Polygram court noted that there may well be an "unpredictability of judicial
endeavors to manage the mysteries of humor"- resulting to a great degree "from the interpo-
sition of value judgments." 170 Cal. App. 3d at 553 n.13, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 258 n.13.
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ments at issue in defamation in humor actions, as well as a lack of stan-
dards to guide the courts. When these factors are added to the
overwhelming constitutional considerations, plaintiffs' rights to protect
their reputations have been minimized.
V. ANALYZING THE CARSON COURT'S APPROACH
The Carson opinion exemplifies unresolved problems of how to ob-
jectively and equitably determine when humor becomes defamation.
While the conclusion that Carson's dentistry skit was not defamatory
may ultimately have been the appropriate outcome, the court used a hap-
hazard method of analysis to justify its holding.
The court dismissed the first amendment's protection of opinions by
stating that Carson's remarks are protected to the extent that they reflect
his attitude that Mendeleson should "lighten up.' 1 6 The court noted
that humor and comedy, not being synonymous with opinion,117 cannot
be given the same blanket first amendment protection. However, the
court did not specify which portions of Carson's skit were opinion and
which were not. This leaves the impression that the court was aware that
an important constitutional consideration was lurking, but was not quite
certain as to its application.
The court then proceeded to string together five vague and ambigu-
ous standards from past defamation cases," 8 without any analysis or
commentary. Again, the court recognized that these standards may have
some relevance to the case, but did not connect them to Carson. This
approach exhibits the judge's lack of confidence in these standards, as
well as an uncertainty of whether, and how, to pick and choose among
them.
The court, citing Frank, listed a sixth standard stating that the man-
ner in which humorous statements will be viewed will depend upon the
context in which they were delivered.' '" Unfortunately, the "analysis"
that followed relied heavily on Frank. In fact, the court used that deci-
sion as a "fill-in-the-blanks" opinion- using virtually the same verbiage
and replacing only the particulars.' 20 Like Frank, the Carson court
116. N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 1988, at 13, col. 2.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 13, col. 3
120. For example, the court in Frank stated: "No person who has ever had the dubious
pleasure of filling out a 1040 Federal tax form would . . . believe that he could claim his
favorite Boston Fern as a dependent." Frank, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 874-75. From the Carson
opinion we get "No person who has ever had the dubious pleasure of spending hours in a
dentist's chair would equate root canal... with nuclear holocaust." N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 1988, at
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looked to the nature of the performance and the fact that Johnny Carson
has performed nightly for over twenty-five years. Based on these facts,
the court reasoned that the skit was "devoid of serious meaning or in-
tent," 121 and was incapable of being construed otherwise.
This type of reasoning appears grossly unfair to Mendelson or any
other plaintiff who brings a suit against a well-known entertainer. The
court implied that Johnny Carson's stature as a comedian, made it un-
likely, if not impossible, for Carson to make defamatory remarks during
the Tonight Show. This subjectivity and bias precluded Mendelson from
receiving fair consideration of his complaint. Further, by relying so
heavily on Frank, the court displayed a reluctance to engage in a mean-
ingful and original analysis. This implies that the court had predeter-
mined the outcome and then sought to find applicable support. While
such a method may not be uncommon, it illustrates the subjectivity in-
volved in these types of actions.
The sketchy analysis in Carson makes it difficult to identify the
court's reasoning and the factors upon which it based its decision. The
superficial attention given to the competing interests provides no insight
as to how they were balanced or whether they were even weighed. If set
guidelines were available, the court may not have engaged in this type of
subjective reasoning.
VI. A WORKABLE SOLUTION: ADOPTION OF OBJECTIVE CRITERIA
The courts' subjective methods for deciding when defamation in hu-
mor actions can go to the jury has produced random and unpredictable
holdings. Without the use of stronger guidelines, judges will continue to
look at comedy on an "I know it when I see it" basis. Plaintiffs will be at
the mercy of a judge's personal values, sense of humor and mood. Judges
need criteria to minimize the flaws in the current hit and miss approach.
While it is not possible to remove subjectivity entirely, it can be greatly
reduced.
The proposed criteria, applied collectively, require greater objectiv-
ity in a court's analysis. The courts will apply all the criteria in each
case, rather than randomly selecting one or more standards on a case-by-
case basis. In applying these criteria, judges will be able to consistently
and more objectively determine whether a plaintiff has potentially been
defamed. Thus, the criteria seek only to allow private figure plaintiffs full
13, col. 3. While looking at Frank and Carson side by side it is readily apparent that Carson is
riddled with numerous similar examples and, in fact, mimics Frank in format as well as
content.
121. N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 1988, at 13, col. 3.
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legal recourse available in defamation actions. The guidelines suggested
provide minimum standards for determining whether a defamation ac-
tion will go to a jury.
First, the court should consider the context in which the alleged de-
famatory communication was made. In applying this criteria, the court
should use a predominance standard; whether the context is recognized
as predominately humorous.'22 If the court determines the context is
broadly recognized as predominately humorous, this would favor the de-
fendant. Second, the statement must be unambiguously understood as
being "of and concerning the plaintiff. "' 2 3 If the plaintiff's name is not
specifically mentioned, there must be enough references to him so that he
is clearly recognizable. If there is no specific mention of the plaintiff, or
he is not clearly recognizable by the statements, this would favor the
defendant. Third, the statement must give rise to an impression that it is
true. 124 The court must consider whether the statements are potentially
capable of being true, as opposed to suggesting an impossibility or an
unequivocal falsehood. When a court determines that statements may be
potentially true, the plaintiff's case would be strengthened. Finally, the
judge must determine if the communication is capable of more than one
meaning; one of which can be construed as defamatory. 125 In other
words, even though a statement may be construed in an inoffensive man-
ner, a court must look to see if an offensive construction is at all possible.
If the communication can be construed offensively, this will add weight
to the plaintiff's complaint. The judge must regard the alleged defama-
tory communication in the same way that the public would perceive it. 1
26
Judges will retain the right to dismiss a cause of action if it fails to
state a claim. It is not being suggested that this judicial province be elim-
inated, only that the factors determining whether motions to dismiss will
be granted or denied be clarified. While a judge's decision to grant a
motion to dismiss, demurrer or summary judgment effectively concludes
as a matter of law that the plaintiff has not been defamed, the converse is
122. For example, the weekly show 60 Minutes is predominately recognized as a serious
news reporting program, yet personality Andy Rooney does a purely satirical segment in the
last five minutes of each broadcast. Under the first criterion, consideration of which portion of
the program contained the alleged defamatory communication would be required.
123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564 (1977).
124. Frank v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 100 A.D.2d 252, 257, 506 N.Y.S.2d 869,
873 (1986) (citing Triggs v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 179 N.Y. 144, 71 N.E. at 742-43
(1904)).
125. See Polygram, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 551 (citing Arno v. Stewart, 245 Cal. App. 2d 955,
960, 54 Cal. Rptr. 392, 395 (1966)).
126. See Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Publishing Corp., 242 N.Y. 208, 151 N.E. 209,
211 (1926).
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not true. When a judge applies the proposed criteria and holds that a
communication is reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning, the
judge merely decides that the case may go to the jury. From there, the
jury will resolve the issue of whether defamation occurred.
Comedians' first amendment protections will remain unchanged
under the new criteria. Currently, they must calculate the risk that their
humorous statements may be crossing the line between protected humor
and defamation. Without clear standards, comedians can only guess
where that line is drawn. Accordingly, they must resort to some degree
of self-censorship. The only effect these proposed criteria will have will
be to require that motions to dismiss be decided more objectively and
predictably.
Critics may suggest that if more cases go to a jury, there will be
more decisions against comedians, thereby increasing self- censorship.
However, comedians will benefit from the suggested criteria. They will
know in advance with greater certainty the type of conduct that will
render them liable in a defamation action, thus allowing them to avoid
such actions.
VII. VIEWING CARSON AGAINST THE PROPOSED CRITERIA
Applying the proposed criteria to Carson, Mendelson's case would
have gone to a jury. Looking to the context standard, it is reasonable to
assume that most people have heard of the Tonight Show and know
Johnny Carson as an entertainer. However, the monologue portion of
the show consists of Carson's commentary on factual items, current
events and news, during which both humorous and non-humorous re-
marks are intermingled. A viewer seeing the monologue portion for the
first time would have little, if any, way of knowing whether the show was
predominately humorous.
Next, as the Carson court found, the dentistry skit was certainly "of
and concerning" Mendelson. His name appeared on a marquis behind
Carson throughout the entire sequence, and he was referred to by name
at least ten different times. Mendelson was clearly recognizable. Third,
many of Carson's statements were true. A root canal is a commonly
feared procedure. It is also true that patients do recline in dental chairs,
listen to high speed drills, smell burning tooth enamel, and see clouds of
smoke come from their mouths. Dentists pick food from people's mo-
lars, and from time-to-time have been known to have bad breath.
Although thinly veiled with humor and interspersed with exaggerations
and clever analogies, Carson's remarks were truths commonly known by
anyone who has been a dental patient.
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Finally, under the fourth criterion, it is entirely possible that a
viewer would construe the dentistry skit as offensive to Mendelson.
From Carson's introduction to the segment itself, it is apparent that a
dentist sent a letter objecting to one of Carson's previous remarks and
asked only for a "smirk-free public apology." Mendelson, however, re-
ceived significantly more. He became the target of a Carson monologue
on national television. By name, he was held up to the viewing public for
mockery and ridicule for having dared to voice his displeasure at Carson.
Becoming an undeserving and unrequested object for the amusement of
others seems too high a price for Mendeleson to pay in exchange for
Carson's first amendment protection.
Accordingly, in light of the proposed criteria, Carson's motion to
dismiss should have been denied, and Mendelson's case sent to the jury.
While Mendelson may ultimately have fared no better, he would at least
have received his day in court.
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The law of defamation requires a delicate and thoughtful balancing
between the important interests of first amendment rights of free speech
and the rights of individuals to protect their reputations. While humor
in its many forms is needed and welcome in our society, defamation in
humor involving private figure plaintiffs presents substantial problems
which threaten to disrupt the balance. Judges unnecessarily compromise
plaintiffs' reputation interests in deference to defendants' first amend-
ment rights. The current judicial method of determining which claims
are actionable must be reformed in order to obtain objective, consistent
and equitable decisions.
Cary Dee Glasberg
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